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Data Execute Prevention (DEP)
Prevents DEP prevents attackers from using application code outside the areas of memory that are not explicitly marked as executable. DEP is a critical part of the broader set of exploit mitigation technologies developed by Microsoft such as ASLR, SeHOP, SafeSEH, and /GS. These mitigation technologies complement one another; for example, DEP’s weaknesses tend to be offset by ASLR and vice versa. DEP and ASLR used together are very difficult to bypass.
Structured Exception Handler Overwrite Protection (SEHOP)
Prevents The SEHOP mitigation technique prevents attackers from making use of the Structured Exception Handler (SEH) overwrite exploitation technique. SEH overwrites are commonly used by exploits that target the increasing number of browser-based vulnerabilities. The SEHOP mitigation technique is made possible because of an implicit side effect of an SEH overwrite. When the When the majority of stack-based buffer overflows occur, an attacker will implicitly overwrite the next pointer of an exception registration record prior to overwriting the record’s exception handler function pointer. Because the next pointer is corrupted, the integrity of the exception handler chain is broken. This insight, in combination with ASLR, is what allows SEHOP to effectively mitigate SEH overwrites. (For more information about SEHOP, go to the Microsoft TechNet Blogs at http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2009/02/02/preventing-the-exploitation-of-seh-overwrites-with-sehop.aspx.)
Null Page Protection (NullPage)
NullPage pre- Pre-allocates the null page to prevent exploits from using it for malicious purpose. Please note this is a pseudo mitigation designed to break current exploit techniques; It is not designed to break future exploits.
Heap Spray Protection (HeapSpray)
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HeapSpray pre-allocates areas of memory that are commonly used by attackers to allocate malicious code. Exploits that rely on controlling these areas of memory (and then jumping into them) will fail. Please note this is a pseudo mitigation designed to break current exploit techniques; It is not designed to break future exploits.
Export Address Table Filtering (EAF)
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EAF regulates access to the Export Address Table (EAT), allowing or disallowing read/write access based on the calling code originating from a shellcode. With EMET in place, most of today’s shellcode will be blocked when it tries to lookup the APIs needed for its payload. In addition, EMET tries to prevent attempts by shellcode and ROP gadget to clearing the hardware breakpoints used for this mitigation.
Export Address Table Filtering Plus (EAF+) - Blocks read attempts to export and import table addresses originating from modules commonly used to probe memory during the exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities.
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